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INTRODUCTION
I see roughly this-there is a realm of utterance of delight, when
you taste pleasant food or smell a pleasant smell, etc.... ]hen
there is the realm of Art which is quite different, though often
you may make the same face when you hear a piece of music as
when you taste good food.
Ludwig Wittgenstein'
Though not exhaustive, the list of works included in § 102 of the Copyright
Act is generally accepted to provide boundaries for copyrightable subject
matter. While visual and audio sensations make the list, scents and tastes do
not.2 However, the past decade has seen an increased discussion regarding
whether copyright should be expanded to cover works which have aesthetic
value that lie in our sense of taste and smell.3 In the United States, few cases
exist that touch on the issue of whether tastes and scents are copyrightable. For
tastes, the most prominent recent case occurred in the Seventh Circuit, wherein
Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith Cotp., the Court held that an author's
"compilation copyright [in a cookbook] ... may not extend to cover the
individual recipes themselves, but only the manner and order in which they are
presented.' 4 As for scents, whether or not a perfume can be copyrighted has
never been addressed.5 Some have attributed this to the traditionally lower
status that Western society has given to smell and taste as "lower" sensations.
6
Such status, in turn, has led to society's dismissal of the culinary arts and the art
of perfumery as not real art, or at least, merely "minor arts." 7  Another
viewpoint might suggest that this lack of attention is due to scents and tastes
I LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS ON AESTHETICS, PSYCHOLOGY,
AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF.
2 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Copyright Protetion for Perfumes, 45 IDEA 19 (2004); see also J.
Austin Broussard, An Intellectual Property Food Fight Whj Copyright Law Should Embrace Cunag
Innovation, 10 VAND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 691 (2008).
4 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cit. 1996).
5 David A. Einhorn & Lesley Portnoy, The Copyrightabikly of Perfumes: I Smell a Symphony, 17
INTELL. PROP. TODAY 8, 9 (2010).
6 Broussard, supra note 3, at 724.
7 CAROLYN KORSMEYER, MAKING SENSE OF TASTE: FOOD AND PHILOSOPHY 109 (1999); see
also Carolyn W. Korsmeyer, On the 'Aesthetic Senses" and the Development of Fine Arts, 34 J.
AESTHETICS & ART CRiTiCISM 67 (1975).
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being functional-rather than aesthetic-expressions.8 Still others maintain
that the inability to be fixed in a tangible medium undercuts the viability of
scents and tastes as proper copyrightable subject matter.9
Yet, given advances in the modern scientific understanding of gustatory and
olfactory sensations, as well as the large popularity of celebrity chefs and fine
dining as entertainment, some have argued that the above reasons are not
compelling and that, instead, copyright protection should be expanded to
include scents and tastes. 10 For one thing, the physicality of scents and tastes
do not appear any less real, substantial, or fleeting than the case of live musical
performances or words written in the sand, yet even these experiences may
enjoy some level of copyright protection." Moreover, the expressions of the
world's finest chefs and perfume makers in their dishes and perfumes,
respectively, seem no less original, creative, or deserving of respect than that of
visual artists, writers, or composers. As one commentator put it, "[t]he
aesthetic expressiveness of a particular culinary dish is in many ways no less
communicative than a Miles Davis jazz piece or the vibrant colors of a Mark
Rothko painting, even if the description of the dish cannot be easily couched in
traditional emotional idiom."'12
This Article explores the reason for the law's resistance to extending
copyright protection to scents and tastes. Specifically, it views the originality
and expression requirements of copyright protection as limiting copyrightable
subject matter to expressions that engage both author and audience-artist and
beholder-in a way that requires reflection upon the work. This requirement of
reflection-or the capady for reflection-poses a demand for intersubjective
communicability that I call the work's "public dimension." This Article argues
that the sensations of taste and smell are inescapably immediate and private,
8 See, e.g., Robert Kry, The Copyright Law, 111 YALE L.J. 761 (2001) ("When a recipe consists of
nothing more than a list of ingredients, it is uncopyrightable, because that list of ingredients is
essential to expressing the method of preparing the dish. A list of ingredients has functional
substitutes (there are many different recipes for chocolate cake). But since it has no descriptive
substitutes, the merger doctrine bars copyright.").
9 Einhorn & Pormoy, supra note 5, at 8 (" 'Tlhe scent [of a perfume] itself is too fleeting and
variable and dependent on the environment... [but the] material [Liquid] that gives off the scent
can be perceived through the senses and is sufficiently concrete and stable to be considered a
'work' under the Copyright Act.' " (quoting from a translation of the Dutch lower court of
appeals decision in HR 16 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 585 m. nt. J.H. Spoor (kecofa/Lancome) (Neth.))).
10 Broussard, supra note 3,passim.
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012) (on the "Unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound
recordings and music videos"); see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[B][2], at 8-33 (2010) ('Wtiting in sand is tangible in form even if the next
wave will erase it forever.').
12 Broussard, supra note 3, at 719.
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suggesting that they lack the kind of public dimension that visual and audio
works exhibit. Indeed, this creates an ineffability characterized by a lack of the
sort of originality and expressiveness that underlie copyright protection under
both the "moral rights" and "progress of the arts and sciences" rationales,
though more so for the second rationale, which is the basis for U.S. copyright
law. The latter disconnect is particularly suggestive: because taste and scent's
desired artistic effects on us are ineluctably connected with private interests of
pleasure, works of taste and scent cannot escape the utilitarian function that
limits copyright protection in the United States. This Article will argue that the
reason this utilitarian function does not also subsume the pleasures one
experiences from visual and audio works of art is because these works engage
our capacity for reflection in a necessarily communicable way-one that makes
a public claim for an explanation, even if none is forthcoming.
Part I begins with an examination of some of the cases, legal principles, and
policies behind why tastes and scents are generally not considered copyrightable
subject matter. This section focuses on the originality and expression
requirements for copyright protection in the United States and explores how
various courts have used these requirements to articulate the extent of
protection for tastes and scents. Part I also examines arguments both for and
against copyright protection for tastes and scents, with the general thrust of this
section being to isolate and articulate three key questions that the originality and
expression requirements ask of copyrightable material: (1) What is the nature of
the work-its original expressiveness-to be copyrighted?; (2) What is the
work's purpose to the public?; and (3) Is the work discovered or created?
Part II elucidates how the concepts of originality and expression parallel
philosophical analyses of aesthetic judgments and subjective taste in their legal
justifications. Guided by philosopher Carolyn Korsmeyer's central insight that
the arts of taste and smell hold a necessary relation to the immediate sensory
pleasure which they are intended to incite, this Part will argue that these arts are
subsumed by the utilitarian funcdon that limits copyright protection. Paralleling
Korsmeyer's distinction between the "lower" (or base) senses and the "higher"
(or aesthetic) ones is a distinction found in Immanuel Kant's aesthetic theory
between private judgments of the "agreeable" and "normative" judgments of
beauty.13 The "agreeable" senses concern sensations that Kant associated with
what he called the "taste of sense. '14 These are contrasted with judgments
originating from the "taste of reflection," which are described as judgments that
13 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 55-66 (Werner Pluhar, trans., Hackett Pub. Co.
1987).
14 Id. at 57.
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are likewise subjective in nature, but have a normative component to them,
which prompts Kant to call these "judgments of the beautiful."15 Applying this
distinction to the topic of what constitutes copyrightable subject matter is not
meant to suggest that only beautiful works are copyrightable. Rather, the
distinction reinforces the private validity of judgments about works of taste and
smell. This private validity coincides with their incommunicability as private
objects of immediate bodily sensations, a feature that thwarts the core purposes
of copyright.
I. CONSIDERING TASTES AND SCENTS AS COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."1 6 Copyright
law pertains specifically to "securing... to Authors... the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings."'1 7  Though ultimately traced back to this
Constitutional provision,18 the three requirements for copyrightability-
originality, expression, and fixation-are articulated in § 102 of the U.S.
Copyright Act, which states that "Copyright protection subsists ... in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.., from which
they can be perceived ....
A. THE ORIGINALITY AND EXPRESSION REQUIREMENTS
In the landmark case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telohone Service Co., the
Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality." 20 The
originality requirement calls for "the work [to be] independently created by the
author (as opposed to being copied from other works), and that it possess[] at
least some minimal degree of creativity." 21  Moreover, it requires only a
modicum of creativity, where unless "the creative spark is utterly lacking or so
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent," 2 the requirement will be fulfilled. The
justification for having such a minimal creative requirement has been
15 Id.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 Id.
18 With particular emphasis on the words "Authors" and "Writings."
19 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
20 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
21 Id. (citing 1 NiMVMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, §§ 2.01 [A]-[B], at 2-7 to -18).
22 Id. at 359.
[Vol. 21:1
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uncontroversial ever since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's stem reminder in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure
to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them
repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would
have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge.23
To prevent judges from being "final judges of the [artistic] worth" of a given
work of art, Bleistein views the originality requirement as imposing minimum
limits based on copyright's constitutional purpose of promoting the arts. 24 In
practice, judges look to the § 102(a) categories that, while "illustrative and not
limitative," 25 act as a gatekeeper to whether a work is protected under
copyright.26 Though scents and tastes are not included under the 5 102(a)
categories, the arguments advanced below explore the conceptual, policy-based
reasons for this-reasons that ultimately concern copyright's originality and
expression requirements.
The Supreme Court in Feist held that the alphabetical arrangement and
selection of numbers and information for a telephone directory "lack[ ] the
modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable
expression." 27 For one thing, the data being collected in the matter at issue
were facts, which are not copyrightable: "It is this bedrock principle of
copyright that mandates the law's seemingly disparate treatment of facts and
23 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
24 Id.; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) (examining Bleistein to
conclude that "nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly
unique or novel.... All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
'author' contributed something more than a 'mere trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his
own.' Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.' No
matter how poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own.").
25 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
26 See, e.g., Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1983) (determining
that a toy airplane is copyrightable by first looking to see if it fits under § 102(a)(5)).
27 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
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factual compilations. 'No one may claim originality as to facts.' This is because
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. '28 While one can
copyright a compilation, the originality and expression requirements mandate
that only the manner and method of selection are protected:
[C]opyright protection may extend only to those components of a
work that are original to the author. Thus, if the compilation
author clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or
she may be able to claim a copyright in this written expression.
Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but
not the precise words used to present them .... [But w]here the
compilation author adds no written expression but rather lets the
facts speak for themselves, the expressive element is more
elusive. 29
This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is limited.
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use
the facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing
work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and
arrangement.30
The problem in Feist was that the selections and arrangements were either
too mechanistic or too essential to the works in question. In particular,
alphabetical arrangement was said to be a nearly ineluctable format when the
element components are phone numbers and addresses. This rationale parallels
a principle expressed in Baker v. Selden, where the Supreme Court held that
blank account books were not deserving of copyright protection, in part
because of the necessity of blank components to the usefulness of the class of
works in question:
[W]here the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the
methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered
as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the
public; not given for the purpose of publication in other works
28 Id. at 347 (internal citation omitted).
29 Id. at 348-49 (internal citation omitted).
30 Id.
[Vol. 21:1
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explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical
application. 31
Thus, the Court in Baker concluded that the functional necessity that blank
pages have with account books resulted in this expressive element "given
therewith to the public." 32 Feist might similarly be viewed as turning upon the
functional necessity of an alphabetical arrangement, given the Court's
comments on the practical necessity of an alphabetical telephone directory.33 In
other words, the expressive element of alphabetizing is-for all practical
purposes-a functional necessity when it comes to a telephone directory.
Feist and Baker thus show how the originality requirement speaks to the
fundamentally utilitarian public principle embedded in the constitutional
provision for copyright, i.e., "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."34 In Feist, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor put this point in terms of the
idea/expression dichotomy:
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work. This principle,
known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy,
applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual
compilation, assuming the absence of original written expression,
only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected;
the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair
nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.35
The idea/expression dichotomy can help to determine what constitutes
copyrightable subject matter when analyzed closely in conjunction with the
originality requirement. Statutorily, this dichotomy is embodied in 5 102(b) of
the Copyright Act, which provides that, "[i]n no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
31 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
32 Id.
33 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 363 (commenting that to arrange a telephone directory alphabetically is
"not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable").
34 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
35 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (internal citations omitted).
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system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work. '36  Though often criticized for its lack of clarity and ease,37 the
idea/expression dichotomy and its relationship to originality achieve their best
articulation in Feist
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the
fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To borrow
from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its "maker" or
"originator." "The discoverer merely finds and records." 38
Though the discovery/creation dichotomy tracks the idea/expression
dichotomy imperfectly, it provides paradigms that are, for the most part, clear.
One discovers a mathematical formula, but creates a poem (though both might be
called elegant or beautiful).
Applying these lessons from the fact/compilation distinction and the
idea/expression dichotomy to scents and tastes, the following three questions
emerge:
(1) For Original Expressiveness of the Work: What is the work to be
copyrighted in the case of a scent or a taste, and does its
original expressiveness lie in the elements of the work
themselves or in its selection and arrangement?
(2) For Pupose of the Work: Is the work functionally necessary in
that it is "for the purpose of practical application" 39 and thus
"given therewith to the public," 4 or is it instead "given for
the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the
art"?41
(3) For Source of the Work: Related to (1), was the work
discovered or created?
36 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
37 See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivioy: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
and the Inevitabilit of Artisic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990); Leslie Kurtz, Speaking to the
Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1221 (1993).
38 Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (internal citations omitted).
39 Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
40 Id
41 Id.
[Vol. 21:1
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In answering question (1), if only the selection and arrangement are what
constitute the original expressiveness of the author, then only that will be
copyrightable, subject to the further limitation posed in (2), that the selection
and arrangement not be functionally necessary. Question (3) serves as a rough
guide for the idea/expression dichotomy. These background questions will
guide our analysis of how courts have dealt with the copyrightability of tasks
and scents.
B. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF TASTES AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The issue of the copyrightability of tastes has generally been examined by
evaluating recipes. Looking to the statute, gourmet chefs in the United States
have had to make do with copyrights in their recipes qua compilations or
collective works, where what is being compiled and collected are presentations
of the ingredients and the methods used to combine them together to make a
culinary dish.42 This protection, however, is severely attenuated because the
fact/compilation distinction denotes the listing of ingredients as simple
statements of fact and thus non-copyrightable material. The Copyright Office
reflects this exclusion by explicitly stating that "mere listing[s] of ingredients or
contents" are among the materials not subject to copyright protection.43
Melville Nimmer also reinforces the exclusion of perfume formulas and recipes
from copyright protection, though he does leave open the possibility for
copyrighting recipes:
Mere listings of ingredients as in recipes, formulas, compounds,
or prescriptions are not subject to copyright protection.
However, when a recipe or formula is accompanied by substantial
literary expression in the form of an explanation or directions, or
when there is a combination of recipes, as in a cookbook, there
may be a basis for copyright protection .... Copyright protection
may extend to a description, explanation, or illustration, assuming
that the requirements of the copyright law are met.44
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see also Christopher I. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of
Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121,
1126 (2006) (discussing the scant history of "recipes vis-i-vis copyright law" and examining the
case of Belford, Clarke & Co. v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488 (1892), which had upheld the protection
of recipes as compilations).
43 Material Not Subject to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2012).
44 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, 5 21.08[C], at 21-343.
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In many ways, Nimmer's guidance here is unhelpful to the question of whether
recipes are copyrightable: no one would seek simply to copyright a laundry list
of ingredients, since every recipe is accompanied by "an explanation or
directions" on how to cook the dish. 45 In fact, the qualification in the last
sentence above shows just how much the question is being punted.
Elsewhere, however, Nimmer writes more definitively: "[E]xtending
copyright protection to recipes ... seems doubtful because the content of
recipes are clearly dictated by functional considerations, and therefore may be
said to lack the required element of originality, even though the combination of
ingredients contained in the recipes may be original in a noncopyright sense."46
Just how much protection recipes can get when they are "accompanied by
substantial literary expression" 47 or "when there is a combination of recipes" 48
was explored in Meredith.49 In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that although
the plaintiff had obtained copyright protection over the compilation of recipes
involving Dannon Yogurt, the individual recipes themselves were excluded
from copyright protection, partly because they "contain no expressive
elaboration upon either of the[iJ functional components, as opposed to recipes
that might spice up functional directives by weaving in creative narrative. 50
What constitutes "expressive elaboration" in Meredith is hinted at when the
court suggests that copyright protection over recipes may be permissible if
"authors lace their directions for producing dishes with musings about the
spiritual nature of cooking or reminiscences they associate with the wafting
odors of certain dishes in various stages of preparation." 51 By comparison, in
Barbour v. Head, the Southern District of Texas refused to grant summary
judgment in favor of a defendant who argued that recipes are uncopyrightable,
in part because "[u]nlike its counterparts in [Meredith], the recipes [here] are
infused with light-hearted or helpful commentary, some of which also appears
verbatim in [the allegedly infringing work]."5 2 Barbour further pointed to a
mimicked parenthetical in one of the recipes-which stated, "This is the secret
to the unique taste!'-and called it "arguably expressive language."5 3
45 Id.
46 1 id. §2.18[M], at 2-208 to -209.
47 5 id. §21.08[q, at 21-343.
48 Id.
49 Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
50 Meredith., 88 F.3d at 480.
51 Id. at 481.
52 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
53 Id.
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What these cases show is that when recipes are considered the original
expression to be copyrighted, scant protection is offered over what one wants
to call the artistic expression of the gourmet chef, i.e., the dish itself. This much
is indicated in Nimmer's remark that "copyright for a recipe clearly will not
prevent others from creating culinary 'dishes' based upon such a recipe, even if
it could prevent the word for word reproduction of the recipe."5 4 Protection
extends not to the recipe as much as to the literary embellishments upon it.
Yet, certainly the creations that a gourmet chef like Emeril LaGasse wants to
take credit for are not the expressions, "Bam!" and "Kick It Up a Notch!," but
instead, his culinary dishes. Because of this, J. Austin Broussard suggests that
these cases rest on "the faulty assumption that the recipe for a dish, rather than
the dish itself, is the proper subject matter of copyright protection. The courts
have unfortunately 'confuse[d] the [copyrightable] work of authorship with the
instructions about how to perform it.' "55 Broussard advocates instead for the
culinary dish to be the copyrightable work.5 6  Because he sees the chief
difficulty behind this proposal as one of fixation (a dish is perishable and thus
an "ephemeral subject"57 ), he further posits that the recipe exists merely to fix
the dish into "a convenient and lasting form of expression."5 8
Separating the copyrightable work from the medium that fixes it, however,
does present some conceptual difficulties that Broussard leaves unexamined.
First, such a proposal seems to ignore Nimmer's remark that "copyright for a
recipe clearly will not prevent others from creating culinary 'dishes' based upon
such a recipe."5 9  Presumably, this is because recipes cannot help acting as
instructions for how to create a culinary dish, not just as a written expression of
the dish. This point will be discussed more fully in Part II. However, even
supposing that it is not problematic to separate the culinary dish from the recipe
that fixes it, a bigger problem becomes apparent when thinking of the culinary
dish as the underlying copyrightable work. With all due respect to Broussard,
this problem has little to do with the history of culinary dishes not being
considered as "works of art." 60 While a dish might be construed to represent
the expression of the chef's authorship and originality, it cannot avoid the
simple fact that it is a work that functions to be consumed. This is in stark
54 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.18 M, at 2-208 to -209.
55 Broussard, supra note 3, at 715 (citations omitted) (quoting Buccafusco, smpra note 42, at 1131).
56 Id. at 716.
57 Id. at 715.
58 Id.
59 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.18[1], at 2-208 to -209.
60 See Broussard, supra note 3, at 717-21 (discussing the role of the history of culinary dishes in
their categorization as not copyrightable).
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contrast to audio and visual works, which are, in some robust sense,
contemplated; in principle, at least, these works strive to be "inexhaustible to
meditation" (literary critic I.A. Richards's famous phrase).61 Moreover, if we
treat the dish as the copyrightable subject matter and the recipe as its fixing
medium, then the original expressiveness must lie in the chefs "selection and
arrangement" 62 of ingredients that create the dish, rather than in the ingredients
themselves; but here, it is impossible to see how the selection and arrangement
are not part of the "practical application" 63 of making the dish-and thus
"given therewith to the public." 64 In other words, art that is constituted by the
chefs selection and arrangement of ingredients so as to make a dish "cannot be
used without employing"65 those precise choices in selection and arrangement.
Consequently, the utilitarian aspects associated with works derived from taste
necessarily subsume their artistic expressiveness.
This last point, I believe, is one that Broussard does not adequately address
when he states that:
Conceptually and legally, the dish itself should be considered the
"work of authorship" under § 102(a), with the recipe for the dish
existing only to satisfy the statutory requirement of fixation.
Viewed in this way, a recipe ceases to be impermissibly functional
or utilitarian under the doctrines of Meredith and Baker because
the recipe exists not merely as an instruction for the creation of
the dish, but as the necessary legal expression of the dish in a
copy fixed in a tangible and lasting medium of expression. 66
Broussard's declarations fail to appreciate how little a recipe expresses if it is
exempted from expressing instructions on how to create the dish. Not only
does this suggestion undermine the ordinary meaning of a recipe, it also departs
significantly from how other expressive representations (e.g., blueprints,
architectural plans, musical scores) relate to their underlying copyrightable
works. 67 Broussard, as it were, wants to have his cake and eat it too, but it is an
unwarranted stretch to stipulate that a recipe should be treated as a legal fiction
solely to fix the expressive aspects of a culinary dish. If a dish is to be
61 I.A. RIcHARDs, COLERIDGE ON IMAGINATION 171 (2d ed. 1950); see infra Part II.
62 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
63 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1980).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Broussard, supra note 3, at 716.
67 See infra Part II.
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considered copyrightable, its original expressiveness must reside in the dish
itself, not the recipe. But whether we treat the recipe or dish as the work at
issue, this cannot survive the utilitarian considerations which urge that a dish is
made to be consumed and a recipe is made to instruct.6 8
C. SCENTS AS COPYRIGHTABLE?
As noted earlier, the issue of the copyrightability of perfumes or other scents
has never been broached in the United States. Nevertheless, perfume makers
have looked to other areas of intellectual property for protection over their
creations. While patent law can offer protection over ingredients so as to
include perfume formulas, 69 the numerous obstacles and costs associated with
obtaining a patent make this avenue extremely onerous.70 Moreover, for larger
perfume companies that can afford the costs associated with obtaining a patent,
the subsequent disclosure of a particular perfume's formula makes the twenty
years of patent protection unattractive. 71 Instead, these perfume companies
have relied on trade secret or looked to trademark law for protection, where
successful suits based on using a brand name in the selling of "copycat"
fragrances are quite rare.72
68 See infra Part I1.
69 See, e.g., Classification Definitions: Class 512, Perfume Compositions, United States Patent
Office, Dec. 2000, http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc800/defs8OO.pdf.
70 See Chandler Burr, Ahb, the Seducive Fragrance of Moecuks Under Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2008, http://www.nytimes.cOm/2008/02/23/business/worldbusiness/23perfume.htm?pagewante
d=aU&_r= (examining the high costs associated with patenting a fragrance, with only a twenty year
window of protection).
71 Field, supra note 3, at 29.
72 See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1924) (holding that rebottling and
repackaging Coty perfume and selling it as such does not constitute trademark infringement);
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) (reversing the district court's ruling and
holding that a copier of an unpatented, but trademarked product could use such trademarks in
advertising to identify the copied product). But see Saxony Prods., Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d
716, 722 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the issue of whether two fragrances were similar in the
context of an unfair competition claim was a disputed issue of fact, and thus not subject to
summary judgment); Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 636 F. Supp.
433, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (enjoining the defendant perfume manufacturer from using in its
packaging the plaintiff's registered trademark in a perfume). Perhaps the most successful
trademark scent case involved not perfume, but a scent associated with yarn. In re Clarke, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (ITAB 1990). In that case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(ITAB) granted a fragrance trademark over "a high impact, fresh, floral fragrance reminiscent of
Plumeria blossoms" associated with the plaintiff's embroidery yam:
Upon careful review of this record, we believe that applicant has demonstrated
that the scented fragrance does function as a trademark for her thread and
embroidery yarn. Under the circumstances of this case, we see no reason why a
15
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Outside the United States, two cases from Europe in 2006 were decided
within days of each other and came to opposite conclusions concerning the
copyrightability of perfumes. In Bsiri-Barbir v. Ste Haarmann et Reimer, the Court
of Cassation (France's Supreme Court) analyzed copyright protection under
Article L.112-1 of the French Intellectual Property code, which provides
protection over "the rights of authors in all works of the mind, whatever their
kind, form of expression, merit or purpose." That Court held that "the
fragrance of a perfume, which arises out of the mere implementation of know-
how, does not constitute the creation of a form of expression capable of being
protected by copyright as a work of the mind." 73  By contrast, the Dutch
Supreme Court held in Lanceme v. Kecofa that a perfume can be copyrightable
subject matter based on a "subjective" rather than an "objective" analysis of the
originality requirement; in other words, we are to look at authorship "from the
perspective of the creator." 74  This holding was handed down despite the
Court's acknowledgement that "not all the copyright act's provisions would
apply to scents, e.g., a consumer's undeniable right to use a perfume will
inevitably lead to 'distribution' of the work. 7 5  In addition, "[r]egarding
infringement, the Dutch [S]upreme [C]ourt said that infringement of the
copyright in a scent can be evidenced by laboratory tests and 'scent
panels' ... [such that] judges will not be required to smell the scents
themselves." 76
These cases show that copyrighting scents faces the same conceptual
challenges and flawed solutions that mire the issue of copyrighting tastes. In
fragrance is not capable of serving as a trademark to identify and distinguish a
certain type of product. It is clear from the record that applicant is the only
person who has marketed yams and threads with a fragrance. That is to say,
fragrance is not an inherent attribute or natural characteristic of applicant's
goods but is rather a feature supplied by applicant.
Id. at 1239 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the TTAB stated that "[i]t should be noted that we
are not here talking about the registrability of scents or fragrances of products which are noted
for those features, such as perfumes, colognes or scented household products." Id. at 1239 n.4.
73 See Isabelle Leroux, Can Fragrances Be Protected by French Copyright?, Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.
twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2007/can-fragrances-be-protected-by-frcench-copyright (translating
and quoting the Court's decision). This decision was contrary to the Paris court of Appeal's ruling in
Sodete Bellure v. L'Orea4 which ruled the fragrance as "the result of an intellectual research of a
composer which appeals to his accumulated imagination and the knowledge to create an original
bouquet of odorous products chosen for an aesthetic goal, and thus constituting a work of the
mind." See The European IP Bulltin, McDermott, Will & Emery, Mar. 2006, http://www.nwe.com/
info/news/euroip0306.pdf (translating and quoting the Court's decision in Societe Bellure v. L'Orea.
74 Leroux, supra note 73.
75 Id.
76 Id
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particular, attempts to copyright the formula of a scent result in the copyright
being subsumed by utilitarian constraints. Furthermore, the proposed solution
to this dilemma is to posit that the copyrightable work is not the formula (or
recipe), but rather the scent itself. This parallels Broussard's suggestion that the
copyrightable work for tastes is the culinary dish, rather than the recipe.
In considering the Dutch Court's case, Professor Kamiel Koelman at the
Vrije Universiteit in the Netherlands has offered several policy-based reasons
for why copyrighting perfumes might have a problematic impact. 77 First,
because most people lack the sort of sophisticated sense of smell required to
distinguish subtle differences between scents, "different perfumes may readily
be held to be alike, and infringements quickly [and inappropriately] found. '78
This, in turn, could create "undue monopolies" that "undermine
competition... [by] allowing only a few perfumes to exist lawfully side-by-
side.' '79 Second,
[J]ust as similarity could easily be found between a claimant's and
an allegedly infringing smell, so too could similarity [be held to
exist] between a claimant's and pre-existing scents. This in fact
could render the protection of smells meaningless in practice, as
most manufactured scents would be deemed not original
anyway.80
This point is particularly poignant when one reconsiders the scent that won
copyright protection in the Dutch case, Lanc6me's 'Tr~sor." As Catherine Seville
has pointed out, while Lanc6me "cries loudly for protection[, it] has a tendency to
forget its own debts[, for] TRISOR itself owes much to two earlier perfumes:
Calvin Klein's ETERNITY and Sophia Grosjman's EXCLAMATION."81 Seville
additionally provides two other policy reasons to think the Dutch Court's decision
was problematic:
It will require considerable creativity to apply certain acts of
copyright infringement (e.g., distribution, making available to the
public) to fragrance, whose fundamental purpose is [to be]
perceived not only by the wearer, but also by those in the vicinity.
77 See Kamiel Koelman, Copyright in the Courts: Perfume as Artisic Expression?, WIPO MAGAZINE
(Sept. 2006), http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2006/05/article_0001.html.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Catherine Seville, Copyright in Perfumes: Smeling a Rat, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 49, 51 (2007).
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Furthermore, [because the Dutch Court's ruling is out of step
with other European Union (EU) countries,] the ruling creates an
unacceptable impediment to the free movement of goods within
the EU.82
While this last point may seem to apply only to the European Union, the global
nature of the perfume market substantiates Seville's worry and advocates for
greater harmony in copyright law between many different countries, including
the United States.
The policy arguments against copyrighting scents differ from those posited
against tastes primarily in two ways. First, the subjectivity of smell is seen to
pose a bigger problem for infringement disputes; second, fragrances are meant
not simply to be smelled by the consumer, but by the public that is within the
consumer's vicinity.83 Nonetheless, the chief difficulties are still shared insofar
as both products are meant to be consumed and are not aesthetically
appreciated in a sustainable way. Moreover, what is posited as the original
expression in each case-the dish or the perfume-makes the underlying
purpose for copyright protection coincide too closely with its utilitarian
function. These difficulties depart significantly from the fundamental purpose
of copyright protection: to grant legal monopolies over non-utilitarian
expressions in order to facilitate the introduction of the ideas into the public
domain. This last point will be explored in the next section.
II. BECAUSE OF THEIR STATUS AS PRIVATE SENSATIONS, TASTES AND
SCENTS LACK THE PUBLIC AND COMMUNICATIVE COMPONENTS THAT
ALIGN WITH A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT
In his article advocating the copyrighting of culinary dishes, Broussard
attempts to explain away the philosophical difficulties by first pointing to the
traditionally lower status that our senses of smell and taste have had in
comparison to the higher senses of hearing and vision, and second, by claiming
that culinary artists have had the short shrift in copyright law's historical
protection of "works of art."84 The argument would be applicable to perfume
makers as well. This bias against the lower senses can be seen in the § 102(a)
categories; the enumerated works are expressions that appeal to our eyes and
82 Id
83 Id.
84 Broussard, supra note 3, at 717-21.
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ears. In "On the 'Aesthetic Senses' and the Development of Fine Arts,"
philosopher Carolyn Korsmeyer writes:
It has long been a commonplace in the field of aesthetics to speak
of the eyes and the ears as the "aesthetic" senses. Objects of the
other senses, it is generally agreed, are not properly called
"beautiful," nor are they the raw material out of which a "fine
art" can be developed.85
After Bleistein,86 one should (rightly) be wary of any attempt to carve
copyrightable subject matter out of classifications as to what constitutes "fine
art" or what might "properly [be] called 'beautiful.' "87 Indeed, under the U.S.
Copyright Office's definition of "literary works," copyright protection extends
to such banal objects as directories, catalogs, and law school textbooks.88
Nevertheless, while Bleistein may stand for the proposition that judges are poor
arbiters of what counts as art, this shortcoming is one from within a particular
field of art: we are to be wary of judges as evaluators of art. In particular, this
does not exclude determinations of law made on non-evaluative bases that
speak to the fundamental purposes of copyright protection. My contention is
not that culinary dishes and fragrances are incapable of containing any
originality or of being called art, but only that they fail to possess an originality
that copyright law was meant to protect.
A. A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT IS TO BRING IDEAS INTO THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR OTHERS TO EVALUATE, UNDERSTAND, USE, AND BUILD
UPON
Commenting on the idea/expression dichotomy, Melville Nimmer points
out that copyright "encroaches upon the author's right to control his works in
that it renders his 'ideas' [as] per se unprotectible [sic] . ,,"9 This fundamental
consequence of copyright law is often overlooked, but it is what drives the
idea/expression dichotomy. It is also what makes the ideal expression
dichotomy so controversial as a tool to be used in determining what constitutes
85 Korsmeyer, supra note 7, at 67.
86 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
87 Korsmeyer, supra note 7, at 67.
88 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FL 109, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF BooKs, MANuscai~m,
AND SPEECHES (2011).
89 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyrght Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180,1192 (1970).
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copyright infringement from within a particular art form. 90 As Jane Ginsburg
has put it, "elucidating what constitutes an unprotectable idea ... and what
comprises protectable expression... is one of the hardest tasks in traditional
copyright analysis." 91 Consider Learned Hand's abstraction test.92 When Hand
writes, "there is a point... where [abstractions] are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended, '93 he means to
underscore a fundamental, yet underappreciated, utility that copyright law helps
generate: the putting forth of one's ideas into the public domain for others to
evaluate, understand, use, and build upon. These ideas were never
"protectable" in a legal sense, but they laid dormant to the public until the
author arguably offered them up in exchange for protection over his or her
expression of them.
The Supreme Court has also intimated that one of the fundamental
purposes of copyright is to encourage the dissemination of ideas that were
never protectable in the first place: "[lt should not be forgotten that the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."'94 Returning to
Nimmer:
Ideas to be meaningful must be expressed in words or by some
other objective manifestation. The point is not that ideas are
useful without expression, but rather that while public
enlightenment may require the copying of ideas from others, it
remains perfectly possible for the speaker (or writer) who copies
ideas from another, to supply his own expression of such ideas.
True, it would often be easier to copy the expression as well as
the idea, but the value of such labor-saving utility is far
outweighed by the copyright interest in encouraging creation by
protecting expression.95
90 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 37; Kurtz, supra note 37.
91 Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superioriy of Coprijght over Sui Generis
Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2559, 2569 (1994).
92 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (1930).
93 Id.
94 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
95 Nimmer, supra note 89, at 1202.
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In the case of culinary dishes and perfumes, however, it simply is not the
case that it is "easier to copy the expression as well as the idea" in a "labor-
saving" way, since the would-be infringer in the case of culinary dishes, for
example, would still end up having to go through the process of purchasing the
ingredients and making the dish.96 More significantly, to place copyright
protection in the dish or perfume is to foreclose any such "public
enlightenment [that] require[s] the copying of ideas from others," since it would
leave no idea unprotected-thus leaving no idea would to be freely
disseminated to the public.97
B. IDEAS ASSOCIATED WITH TASTE AND SMELL ARE IMMEDIATE AND PRIVATE
SENSATIONS OR OBJECTS OF THE MIND INSEPARABLE FROM THEIR
EXPRESSIONS
How does this purpose of copyright relate to considering tastes and scents
as copyrightable subject matter? Recall that Broussard suggests that the
historical dichotomy of the aesthetic and lower senses has been an unnecessary
barrier to expanding copyright protection to tastes and, by extension, to scents
as well. Pace Broussard, I suggest that this dichotomy not only helps explain
why tastes and scents face difficulty in gaining copyright protection, but also
focuses our attention on the nature of these sensations and how that nature is
problematic to the public dimension and purpose underlying copyright. While
chefs and perfume makers are full of inventiveness and personality, the nature
of their art (or craft)98 contains a sensory immediacy that at once makes the idea
that they wish to express inextricably tied to its expression in a private way.
While we might agree with Broussard that the dish is the appropriate
"expression" of the artist, it is also true that the idea he or she wishes to express
is also the dish itself. This is problematic since ideas purport to "enlighten" in
ways that are necessarily free to the public.
Broussard argues that the dichotomy of the lower and higher senses is an
outdated relic of old philosophical and scientific thinking. However, modern
studies in the perception and cognition of art and aesthetic judgment by Nobel
laureate and neuroscientist Eric Kandel seem to support the traditional
96 Id
97 Id.
98 Many defenders of food and perfume as art put the blame on the distinction between "art"
and "craft," suggesting that convention makes us think of the latter as, perhaps, purely utilitarian
(and thus not aesthetic) in nature. While I have my own doubts on the use of these words as
delineating tools in the ontology of aesthetics-I consider poets as both artists and masters of
their craft without seeing any substantive difference between them---disabusing society of this
dichotomy does little to save food and perfume from being engulfed by their utilitarian functions.
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dichotomy by showing how the cognitive mechanisms underlying the "higher"
senses function. At the beginning of his chapter on 'The Biological Response
to Beauty and Ugliness in Art" in The Age of Insight, Kandel writes: "In addition
to instinctive sensory pleasures, we experience higher-order aesthetic and social
pleasures: artistic, musical, altruistic, even transcendental. These higher
pleasures are in part inborn, as in our estimation of beauty or ugliness, and in
part acquired, as in our response to visual art and music." 99 While Kandel
focuses on visual sensations to demonstrate how the brain "assigns different
degrees of meaning to the various shapes, colors, and movements we see,"100
our brain's complex assignation of meaning presumably applies to sound
sensations of music as well. This explains the classical division between lower
and higher sensations:
This assignment of meaning, or visual aesthetics, illustrates that
aesthetic pleasure is not an elementary sensation like the feeling
of hot or cold, or the taste of bitter or sweet. Instead, it
represents a higher-order evaluation of sensory information
processed along specialized pathways in the brain that estimate
the potential for reward from a stimulus in the environment-in
this case, from the work of art that we view.' 0'
That our brain imparts meaning to visual and audio sensations in its actual
perceptions demonstrates the inherent communicability of the "higher senses,"
a communicability that-at least to this point in our human brain
development-is lacking in the cases of taste and smell.
Consider the following summation of how smell sensations work by Doug
Churovich:
[C]olors and sounds transmit their sensory message by means of
transfer mechanisms very different from scents. While the
physiochemical interactions necessary to detect scents require
direct physical contact between nasal receptors and molecules
emitted from the source, the energy-encoded information bearing
an object's colors are transmitted in the medium of light, and
energy-encoded information from a sound source travel through
a wave of transmitted energy across molecules bridging the
99 ERic KANDEL, THE AGE OF INSIGHT 378 (2012).
100 Id.
101 Id.
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distance between the source and the observer. As a result, there
is a physical segregation between the source and the observer for
colors and sounds, but not for scents. The energy-based transfer
mechanisms for colors and sounds, limited primarily by energy
transfer mechanics as opposed to molecular dispersion, not only
enable colors and sounds to travel far greater distances than
scents, but also facilitate the transmission of their energy-encoded
information through cables and over the airwaves, unlike
scents.1
02
Philosopher Carolyn Korsmeyer offers a similar account for taste sensations:
While sight and hearing operate at a distance from their objects,
food and drink are taken into the body, providing it life-
sustaining nutrition. Indeed, the chief purpose of food is to
nourish, and this heavily functional role is another factor that
commonly excludes eating from the intellectual interest of the
philosopher.103
In distinguishing tastes and scents from sights and sounds, the key notion is one
of distance from the perceiver, or, more precisely, immediagy to the perceiver; it is
necessarily through immediate bodily contact that we experience tastes and
scents. 104 The same is not true with visual and auditory works. This is not to
deny that one can "imagine" what it is like to taste or smell an object, but the
idea that is associated with them (and any originality that is tied with its
expression) cannot be communicated to another person in an objective and
verifiable way.
This lack of communicability, I suggest, poses a conceptual difficulty with
the very idea of copyrighting a scent or a taste, and it is related to the earlier
point made in Part I.B about how dishes and perfumes are consumed rather
than contemplated. Sensory immediacy makes contemplation of these works
appear inseparable from the sensation of eating or smelling them. This
forecloses the possibility of the work ever becoming "inexhaustible to
102 Douglas D. Churovich, Scents, Sense or Cents?; Something Stinks in the Lanham Act Scentific
Obstacles to Scent Marks, 20 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 293, 305 (2001) (citing ROBERT W.
BURNHAM ET AL., COLOR: A GUIDE TO BASIC FACTS AND CONCEPTS 18 (1963); WILLIAM A. YOST
& DONALD W. NIELSEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF HEARING 14 (1977)).
103 Carolyn Korsmeyer, Def'ghiful, Decdous, Disgusting, 60 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 217,
217 (2002).
104 Korsmeyer, supra note 7, at 70-71.
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meditation"'105 because to contemplate the work is always to consume it and
exhaust its pleasure. This is not to say that all works eligible for copyright need
to be "inexhaustible to meditation."'1 6 Rather, that works can be contemplated
repeatedly reveals the kind of communicability that adds to the "public
enlightenment"'07 of copying ideas and thus generates the need for copyright
protection.
A similar point about the difference between lower and higher senses was
also made by the twentieth century American philosopher George Santayana:
The senses of touch, taste, and smell, although capable no doubt
of a great development, have not served in man for the purposes
of intelligence so much as those of sight and hearing. It is natural
that as they remain normally in the background of consciousness,
and furnish the least part of our objectified ideas, the pleasures
connected with them should remain also detached .... They have
been called the unaesthetic, as well as the lower, senses; but the
propriety of these epithets ... is due... to the function which
they happen to have in our experience. 08
Where Santayana here speaks of "objectif[ying] ideas," he means to point out
the kind of contemplative distance that comes more naturally to the senses of
sight and hearing.10 9 Part of this, Santayana suggests, is due to the non-spatial
aspects of these sensations: "Smell and taste, like hearing, have the great
disadvantage of not being intrinsically spatial."110 Although sounds share this
non-spatial limitation, "[t]he objectification of musical forms is [nonetheless
possible] due to their fixity and complexity: like words, they are thought of as
existing in a social medium and can be beautiful without being spatial.""' This
idea of "existing in a social medium," I suggest, is part and parcel with
Nimmer's concept of "public enlightenment" discussed above in Part II.A.
And while one might cite "social dining" and "eating for entertainment" as
instances of tastes "existing in a social medium," what makes them social is the
105 RicHARDs, supra note 61, at 171.
106 Id.
107 Nimmer, supra note 89, at 1202.
108 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE SENSE OF BEAUTY 44 (William G. Holzberger & Herman J.
Saatkamp, Jr. eds., 1955).
109 Id
110 Id.
111 Id. at 45.
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sharing of interpersonal experiences-the conversations and observations with
others through language and sight-not the act of eating.
Korsmeyer also points out another interesting facet of the dichotomy
between lower and higher senses:
The arts of the taste and the smell aim, and indeed must aim, at
pleasing-at immediate, sensuous gratification. Their
counterparts to the grotesque, the painful, or the horrifying
would be something like the poisonous, the nauseating, the
indigestible, or the foul; and, practically speaking, any artist
attempting to utilize such a range of taste or smell would sacrifice
both the quality of the product and the audience.
These built[-]in limitations are the basis for the fact that there
is no range of expression available to the taste and the smell, nor
can any such range be developed which is at all usable; and with
the limitation on expression goes a related limitation on
intellectual content." 2
The fact that the arts of taste and smell must necessarily concern immediate
sensuous gratification reveals their expressive limitations, and these limitations
in turn reveal the conceptual difficulty in copyrighting these arts.
Contemplation of a taste or scent is too tightly bound to the sensation, resulting
in an inability to detach the idea of a taste or scent from its expression. However,
because a fundamental purpose in granting a person a copyright over his or her
work is to relinquish the idea freely to the public as something to which (in
Hand's words) "property is never extended,"'113 one cannot grant a copyright
over a culinary dish or a perfume without at the same time closing off all access
to the idea itself.
C. KANT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE AGREEABLE AND THE BEAUTIFUL
CAPTURES THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE LOWER AND HIGHER SENSES AND
UNDERSCORES THE LATTER'S COMMUNICABILITY AND THE PRIOR'S PRIVACY
Because of the sensory immediacy and lack of distance involved in taste and
smell sensations, they are what we might call purely private sensations, forever
112 Korsmeyer, supra note 7, at 70.
113 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (1930).
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mired in their subjectivity." 4 Santayana, in part, suggests that this is due to their
non-representational aspects:
[T]astes have never been so accurately or universally classified
and distinguished; [its] instrument of sensation does not allow
such nice and stable discriminations as does the ear. The art of
combining dishes and wines, although one which everybody
practi[c]es with more or less skill and attention, deals with a
material far too unrepresentable to be called beautiful. The art
remains in the sphere of the pleasant .... n1
By "sphere of the pleasant," Santayana seems to draw on a classification that
Immanuel Kant had earlier espoused in Crifique ofJudgment when advocating for
a distinction between two types of aesthetic judgments based on our sensations,
"judgments of the agreeable" and "judgments of taste (of the beautiful).' ' 1 6
Here, it should be noted that by "taste," Kant is not referring to the sense (or
sensation) as we have been discussing it, but rather to a power to judge based
on sensations." 7 Kant defines the "agreeable" as "what the senses like in
sensation." 8 Discussing them further, he writes:
As regards the agreeable everyone acknowledges that his judgment,
which he bases on a private feeling and by which he says that he
likes some object, is by the same token confined to his own
person. Hence, if he says that canary wine is agreeable he is quite
114 Cf Korsmeyer, supra note 7, at 71 (" 'Distance' is not important as a criterion for aesthetic
experience and, by extension, for works of art. But it is important because it points out the built-
in limitations of the arts of the senses of touch, taste, and smell.").
115 SANTAYANA, supra note 108, at 45.
116 KANT, supra note 13, at 55-60.
117 Id. at 53. Kant uses the term "taste" ambiguously, sometimes to exclude judgments of the
agreeable and other times to include them. (He always means, however, to include judgments of
beauty as judgments of taste.) For example, in the section cited here, Kant actually defines
"taste" as "the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or
disliking devoid of allinterest. The object of such a liking is called beautiful." Id. This would suggest
an exclusion of taste's association with judgments of the agreeable. Yet he also speaks of a "taste
of sense," which he clearly means to associate with judgments of the agreeable. Id. at 57. Above,
I have adopted the more inclusive meaning so as to use Kant's distinction between the "taste of
sense" and the "taste of reflection" to illuminate this Article's discussion of the conceptual
differences between the higher (or aesthetic) senses (of vision and hearing) and the lower senses
(of taste and smell).
118 Id at 47.
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content if someone else corrects his terms and reminds him to
say instead: It is agreeable to me.119
For Kant, a judgment of the agreeable regards only a subject's immediate
liking and concerns only and always the subject's own sensations. No matter
how intense our feeling of pleasure is in the agreeable, or how widespread other
people's likings may be assimilated to our own, the value in a judgment of the
agreeable only ever concerns the perceiving subject's own sensations, such that
one can always take a modest approach to one's liking and say that it merely has
"private validity." To mark this out further, Kant associates judgments of the
agreeable with what he calls the "taste of sense.' 120
By contrast, a judgment of taste (of the beautiful) makes a necessarily
intersubjective claim, marked by its rejection of any recourse to modesty on the
part of the subject:
It is quite different (exactly the other way round) with the
beautiful. It would be ridiculous if someone who prided himself
on his taste tried to justify [it] by saying: This object (the building
we are looking at, the garment that man is wearing, the concert
we are listening to, the poem put up to be judged) is beautifulfor
me. For he must not call it beautiful if [he means] only [that] he
likes it.121
Of these sorts of judgments, "we cannot say that everyone has his own
particular taste"; 122 Kant thus associates judgments of taste (of the beautiful)
with what he calls the "taste of reflection" to reveal their public aspect in
contrast to the inherent ptivagy of the agreeable:
Insofar as judgments about the agreeable are merely private,
whereas judgments about the beautiful are put forward as having
general validity (as being public), taste regarding the agreeable can
be called taste of sense, and taste regarding the beautiful can be
called taste of reflection, though the judgments of both are
aesthetic (rather than practical) judgments about an object .... 123
119 Id. at 55.
120 Id. at 57.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 56.
123 Id. at 57-58 (emphasis added).
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This public/private distinction also signifies a difference in their
communicative capacities. Consider how Kant discusses the inherent lack of
communicability of a judgment generated by the taste of sense (what Kant calls
a "sensory sensation"):
If sensation, as the real in perception, is related to cognition, it is
called sensory sensation; and its specific quality can be
represented as completely communicable in the same way only if
one assumes that everyone has a sense that is the same as our
own - but this absolutely cannot be presupposed in the case of
a sensory sensation. Thus, to someone who lacks the sense of
smell, this kind of sensation cannot be communicated; and, even
if he does not lack this sense, one still cannot be sure that he has
exactly the same sensation from a flower that we have from it.
Still more, however, we must represent people as differing with
regard to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the sensation of one
and the same object of the sensations ... 124
By contrast, "one who judges with [the] taste [of reflection] ... may assume his
feeling to be universally communicable .... " 125 While we do not have to go so
far as Kant to posit aesthetic judgments as capable of universal communicability
(an intersubjective communicability will suffice), the key point is that the
agreeable cannot be considered a communicable expression because it can
never be "represented as completely communicable."1 26
Moreover, while Kant somewhat paradoxically associated a feeling of
disinterested pleasure with these judgments,127 the point of this association was
to emphasize how these judgments concerned works in a way that was devoid
of all interest in the perceiver. 128 This mirrors the principle in copyright where
works that inherently and necessarily appeal to the subjective interests of a
perceiver are inescapably driven by their utilitarian function.
124 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 171 (Paul Guyer ed. & Eric
Matthews, trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (footnotes omitted). (I use a different translation
here for the sake of clarity.)
125 Id. at 173.
126 Id.
127 KANT, supra note 13, at 44-51.
128 Id.
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D. THE PRIVATE AND INCOMMUNICABLE LIMITATIONS OF TASTE AND SMELL
MAKE THEM INCAPABLE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The upshot of the Kantian distinctions explored in the last section is this:
the essential privacy and incommunicability of the agreeable senses demonstrate
that any ideas associated with them are likewise private and incommunicable.
This is precisely the predicament we have with the ideas that underlie the works
of taste and smell, with the consequence being that they are incapable of
copyright protection.
Recall Korsmeyer's observation that the very nature of how we experience
tastes and scents-i.e., via immediate bodily contact-creates built-in
limitations to the arts of taste and smell. 129 These limitations show that "there
is no range of expression available to the taste and the smell, nor can any such
range be developed which is at all usable; and with the limitation on expression
goes a related limitation on intellectual content.'1 30 Adding Kant's insights, we
can postulate that this lack of expressiveness or incommunicability is due to the
fact that any idea of a taste or a smell is never anything more than a private
sensation or object of the mind. The privacy of a scent or taste implicates the
lack of a public sense, or the lack of an inherent communicative claim that
visual and auditory works, by contrast, do possess.
In his dissenting opinion from International News Service v. Assodated Press,
Justice Louis Brandeis wrote:
An essential element of individual property is the legal right to
exclude others from enjoying it. If the property is private, the
right of exclusion may be absolute; if the property is affected with
a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified. But the fact
that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and
labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not
sufficient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property.131
Brandeis might have also added that if the idea or expression is inherently
private, then the "right of exclusion" is necessarily absolute; thus, it makes no
sense to give it the "legal attribute of property."' 32 In the case of a taste or a
scent, the private nature of the idea or expression already guarantees its
exclusivity. Moreover, because access to this idea requires immediate and
129 Korsmeyer, smpra note 7, at 71.
130 Id. at 70.
131 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132 Id.
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bodily contact, the idea or expression can never be separated from its aim of
immediate sensuous gratification. Therefore, utilitarian and functional aspects
are ineluctable constituents of the ideas themselves. Here, we might bring in
some lessons from Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp. and say that either
the idea of a given taste/smell is not "conceptually separable from [its]
subsidiary utilitarian function"'133 or that the work does not "stimulate in the
mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its
utilitarian function."1 34 Finally, if the idea is private and thus its exclusivity is
built-in, guaranteed, and absolute, then there is no sense in which extending
copyright protection over its expression would be accompanied with adding the
complementary idea to the public domain as a per se unprotectable idea. None
of this means that chefs and perfume makers cannot be considered artists, but
rather that the inherent limitations of taste and smell make their works
incapable of copyright protection. Copying them in a way that generates a free
public good in the idea simply is not possible.
CONCLUSION
Both Broussard's suggestion that a coprightable work is severable from the
medium that fixes it and the Dutch Supreme Court's ruling that copyrightability
may be determined through a subject analysis fail to take into account the
substantial conceptual difficulties that the nature of taste and smell pose to
calling a chef's culinary dish and a perfume maker's fragrance eligible for
copyright protection. Because both the dish and the perfume necessarily
require immediate bodily contact with these works to access the artist's
expression, neither can escape the inherent privacy and incommunicable aspects
attached to the perceiver's contemplation of the work. As such, they both lack
a "public enlightenment" component that justifies the need to extend copyright
protection to these works. Moreover, neither a culinary dish nor a fragrance
can avoid their inherent utilitarian functions of pleasing the palate or olfactory
senses of their perceivers.
The problem is not so much that the function is one of pleasing the senses;
certainly visual and auditory works can and do aim to please the eyes and ears
of their perceivers. But when this gratification function coincides exactly with
any contemplation of the work, the privacy of the idea and expression is
revealed. Perhaps most importantly, because both the idea and expression
associated with a culinary dish or a fragrance already guarantees its exclusivity,
133 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985).
134 Id. at 422.
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there is no sense in which the dish or fragrance can be protected, and the idea
of the dish or fragrance be given to the public as something that is per se
unprotectable. If the culinary dish or perfume is considered the copyrightable
work, there would be no way for another artist to build on the ideas that
underlie these works. This is anathema to a fundamental purpose of copyright
as an engine of free expression and a catalyst to facilitating a freer flow of ideas
in the marketplace.
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